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Abstract 
Striga is an indigenous parasitic weed that attacks cereals and other crops in Africa.  In maize croplands alone, 
Striga infests over 2.3 million ha resulting in 1.6 million tons of grain loss worth US $383 million annually.  An 
innovative approach to controlling the parasite was to induce herbicide resistance in maize and to coat the seed 
with herbicide to provide chemical protection from infection.  This breakthrough that was realized after 12 years 
of collaborative research and development by the International Maize and Wheat Centre (CIMMYT), the Kenya 
Agricultural Research Center (KARI) and the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel, is now ready for 
deployment in Sub-Saharan Africa.  This effort is most advanced in Kenya, where one variety of the Imazapyr-
resistant (IR) maize hybrid aptly named Ua Kayongo (Striga Killer) was tested by over 13,000 households and 
registered for commercial release by Western Seed Company. Compared to a currently recommended 
commercial hybrid (H513), Ua Kayongo improved maize yields by 1,022 kg ha
-1, reduced Striga expression by 
81% and increased farmer’s net return by $143 ha
-1 (+63%).  This technology occupies a central role in the 
design of comprehensive Striga Eradication Initiatives in maize fields, but hindrance to achieving this goal has 
emerged from unlikely sources.  Crop breeders committed to developing alternative, Striga-immune varieties 
self-indulgently dismiss IR maize as a technological dead-end single gene approach, while “green” interests 
unfairly label IR-maize a GMO.  A public-private partnership has formed to deploy IR maize to needy African 
farmers.  Differences in operational approaches are expected among these partners, given their underlying 
interests and organizational mandates, and it is important that these issues continue to be resolved in a manner 
that does not lose momentum or shift focus.  Now that Striga has become a preventable disorder in maize fields, 
it is time to minimize the drama and direct all available resources toward assisting Striga’s victims in Africa. 
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Introduction 
Striga is a parasitic plant that originates from African 
grasslands but has now invaded vast areas of its 
cropland.  Native grasses and traditional African 
cereals have some resistance, but most domesticated 
cereals have little or no ability to fight off the parasite.  
Germinated Striga seeds infect host roots, feeding on 
the plant below-ground for several weeks, and then a 
fast growing shoot emerges that produces prolific 
flowers and thousands of tiny seeds (Odhiambo and 
Woomer 2005).  Host plants exhibit a range of 
symptoms including severe stunting, twisted growth 
and bronzing, and severely infested plants produce 
little or no yield.  Two species of the parasite affect 
cereal crops in Africa, Striga hermonthica, with 
lavender flowers and common in East and West 
Africa, and in the Sahel, and S. asiatica, with red 
flowers that has colonized croplands in Southern 
Africa (Mohamed et al. 2001). About 20 million 
hectares of cropland in Sub-Saharan Africa are now 
infested with Striga causing massive crop loss.  Maize 
is particularly susceptible to Striga and the parasite 
damages this host across the major maize production 
areas of the continent (AATF 2006).  A compilation of 
available data suggests that Striga has invaded 2.4 
million ha of maize cropland inflicting annual grain 
losses of 1.6 million tons valued at US $383 million 
(Table 1).  In Kenya, Striga is most severe in the Lake 
Victoria Basin and western midlands where it occurs 
on 217,000 acres causing annual maize loss of an 
estimated 182,000 tons valued at US $29 million per 
year (Table 1).  Losses from Striga alone account for 
about 60% of Kenya’s chronic deficit in maize.  But 
the greatest losses are suffered by millions of small-
scale farmers who see their crops destroyed season 
after season, unable to grow enough food to feed their 
families or make modest improvements in their lives.  
Too many farm households have developed a fatalistic 
attitude toward Striga, saying that they were born and 
expect to die with Striga in their fields. Striga Management Through Herbicide Resistance 
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From the plant parasite’s point of view, uninformed 
farmers can become very good friends.  First, farmers 
dig the soil, burying last season’s Striga seeds to a 
convenient depth.  Then they plant Striga’s favorite 
host, maize, and later remove other competitor weeds 
early in the season.  Finally, the farmers move through 
their fields at harvest, searching for their stunted ears 
of maize while spreading recently-formed Striga seeds 
to new areas, only to repeat the process the following 
season. Two other factors greatly reduce the 
effectiveness of hand weeding: much of the crop 
damage occurs before the Striga emerges above 
ground and Striga continues to mature in the field after 
maize has been harvested.  From the farmer’s point of 
view, it is easy to understand why they do not weed 
underground pests and failing crops.  Conversely, 
informed farmers engaged in well-directed collective 
action can become Striga’s worst enemy, leading to its 
eradication from infested croplands. 
The dream of Striga eradication 
The agricultural community responded to the threat of 
Striga to maize in several ways.  Farmers identified 
land races that offered some resistance to Striga and 
these were later improved through conventional maize 
breeding to produce Striga tolerant maize varieties.   
Basically, the tolerant crop evades Striga by producing 
deeper roots, and does not display as severe 
aboveground symptoms despite being infected (Ejeta 
and Butler 1993).  Another approach is to suppress 
Striga through antagonistic plants. Researchers 
identified pasture legumes that antagonize Striga and 
induce it to unsuccessfully germinate, in a practice 
known as Push-Pull (Khan et al. 2005).  Field 
legumes, such as groundnut, lablab and soybean, were 
also shown to smother Striga and induce suicidal 
germination, and new methods of intercropping or 
rotation were promoted (Carsky et al. 1994; Woomer 
et al. 2005).   Herbicides were identified that kill 
Striga but not maize (Odhiambo and Ransom 1993) 
and these were registered in Africa, but used primarily 
by commercial farmers.   
These new technologies worked, although sometimes 
not as well on farmers’ fields as they did under 
research conditions. Most of them required that poor 
farmers either invest too much money or labor, or 
sacrifice land from their important food crops, or 
encouraged them to grow crops that had little market 
value, or that assumed they develop advanced 
understanding of Striga’s complex ecology. In many 
cases, just overcoming Striga alone was not sufficient 
to restore maize productivity because of low soil 
fertility, plant diseases and insect pests.  Even the few 
farmers who wholeheartedly endorsed these new 
technologies did not eliminate Striga from their fields, 
but rather suffered less severely from it.  But over the 
past few years, an exciting new approach to Striga 
management has emerged, one that allows farmers to 
grow maize and kill Striga at the same time 
(Kanampiu et al. 2002; Odhiambo and Woomer, 
2005). 
Herbicide resistance by maize permits the application 
of relatively small amounts of herbicide to maize seeds 
that in turn provides several weeks of chemical 
protection from parasitic Striga (Kanampiu et al. 
2002).  This technology results from over 12 years of 
research and development by several organizations.   
Resistance by maize to the herbicide Imazapyr was 
first developed by the US Company American 
Cyanamid. The trait was later provided to the 
International Maize and Wheat Center (CIMMYT) 
that then introduced the trait into its African maize 
breeding program and worked closely with several 
national research organizations.  At its earliest stage of 
technical development, the herbicide  Imazapyr was 
sprayed onto maize in the conventional manner but 
later the Weizmann Institute of Science in Israel 
demonstrated the usefulness of seed application. 
Meanwhile, BASF, a multinational corporation that 
manufactures Imazapyr, acquired American Cyanamid 
and the herbicide resistant germplasm was 
incorporated into its CLEARFIELD
® program.  In a 
series of well-covered events, The African 
Agricultural Technology Foundation (AATF), BASF 
and CIMMYT announced their partnership designed to 
deliver this technology to Africa’s poor farmers 
(Kanampiu et al. 2006). 
The deployment in Africa 
African institutions also played an important role in 
the development of IR maize technology.  The first 
Imazapyr resistant (IR) maize in Africa was developed 
at CIMMYT-Zimbabwe and later at CIMMYT-Kenya 
in collaboration with the Kenya Agricultural Research 
Institute (KARI).  KARI multiplied seeds for 
technology testing and plant breeding.  The 
practicality of coating Imazapyr resistant maize seeds 
with the Imazapyr herbicide was first demonstrated 
through collaborative research at the KARI-Kibos 
station outside of Kisumu (Kanampiu et al. 2002).   Woomer and Savala  
Agriculture and Sustainable Development  491 
However, by 2004, it was necessary to test this 
technology on a larger scale. When no other institution 
was prepared to invest in such an undertaking, AATF 
stepped in and funded the multiplication of Ua 
Kayongo by Western Seed Company. A campaign of 
pre-release testing of IR maize was launched by AATF 
(Otieno et al. 2005) and the technology was introduced 
to over 13,000 farmers and compared to other Striga 
management options at 120 locations in west Kenya 
(Woomer et al. 2005) with very promising results 
(Table 2).  Compared to a currently recommended 
commercial hybrid (H513), Ua Kayongo improved 
maize yields by 1,022 kg ha
-1, increased farmer’s net 
return by $143 ha
-1 (+63%, calculated from Table 2) 
and reduced Striga expression by 81% (data not 
presented).  AATF also served as an ‘honest broker’ to 
ensure that the intellectual property of BASF was 
respected and that technologies reached the intended 
beneficiaries (AATF 2005).  
Next, several IR maize hybrids and open pollinated 
varieties were approved by the Kenya Plant Health 
Inspection Service (KEPHIS) and released to 
commercial seed companies. The Kenyan Pest Control 
Products Board (PCPB) approved Imazapyr as 
STRIGAWAY® under application from BASF and 
Topserve (Kenya) in June of 2006.  Two public events 
were organized around the commercial release of the 
IR maize hybrid Ua Kayongo (Striga Killer) that was 
well attended by farmer organizations and rural 
development agencies. Ua Kayongo is now marketed 
by Western Seed Company of Kitale, Kenya. 
CIMMYT continued to work with numerous national 
partners and announced plans for widespread release 
of IR maize varieties in Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Uganda and Zimbabwe during 2008 
based upon the approach employed in Kenya.  AATF 
developed a series of Striga Eradication strategies 
designed to accelerate the deployment of IR maize and 
combine IR maize technology with other, more agro-
ecologically based practices (AATF 2006).  By all 
appearances, IR maize was developed for African 
farmers victimized by Striga through a model public-
private partnership and now Africa is  poised to 
effectively combat Striga infestation of maize.   
The Challenges 
The drama that is hindering the rapid deployment of 
IR maize to needy African farmers results from two 
basic sources, ideologies that oppose the use of 
herbicides and induced crop resistance; and late-
emerging differences in operational approaches 
between partners in the IR maize collaboration.  An 
early criticism of IR maize was leveled in Seedling 
magazine that questioned the environmental safety of 
inducing herbicide resistance through mutagenesis 
(Grain 2006), although no data in support of this claim 
were presented.  Furthermore the article warned of 
“strangleholds” on African small-scale farmers 
through the use of patented seed and agricultural 
chemicals and questioned the web of contracts forming 
around BASF’s “donation” of the technology.  This 
article appeared well researched through its attention 
to detail, but its “green” bias was evident throughout 
and it expressed little sympathy toward Striga’s 
victims in Africa.  Chemical companies and 
biotechnology interests are inured to attacks by 
myopic environmentalists, but it is unfortunate that no 
response to the damaging claims in this article was 
prepared by the AATF-BASF-CIMMYT partnership.  
A more damaging source of criticism arose from other 
crop breeders labeling IR maize as a technological 
dead-end.  Cereal breeders have for decades attempted 
unsuccessfully to develop varieties that are immune to 
Striga infection.  This breeding objective is very 
worthy but to some extent their failure has inhibited 
their recognition of alternative, more accessible 
technologies, including IR-maize.  One of these 
staunchest opponents of the IR maize approach is Prof. 
S.K. Kim, a former maize breeder with the 
International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA), 
who denounced IR maize as a donor’s mistake that is 
ineffective and ultimately counterproductive toward 
his vague principles of “co-survival” and “horizontal 
tolerance” to Striga management.  In a keynote address 
at a conference organized by the African Union to 
better coordinate Striga management efforts in Africa, 
Prof. Kim incorrectly described IR maize as a GMO 
that will “contaminate Africa” (Kim 2007).  Dr. G. 
Ejeta, a crop breeder with Purdue University (USA), 
also dismissed the potential of IR maize varieties for 
reducing the threat of Striga in maize fields at 
important African fora.  Both of these scientists 
presently serve as advisors to donors and appear to 
base their opinions on breeding principles rather than 
field evidence and the plight of Africa’s farmers. 
The AATF-BASF-CIMMYT partnership is designed 
to develop and deliver IR maize to poor African 
farmers, but this confluence of goal is devised from 
very different underlying interests.  BASF, as a 
multinational corporation, is understandably concerned Striga Management Through Herbicide Resistance 
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with corporate image and shareholder profits.  While 
BASF has donated the trait of Imazapyr resistance in 
maize for royalty-free deployment in Africa, its 
licensing agreements with CIMMYT and seed 
companies that control seed coating procedures do not 
allow the use of alternative herbicides or procedures. 
The potential market is relatively large and competing 
interests offer alternative Striga management 
technologies.  If all 2.36 million ha of Striga-affected 
maize in Africa were planted in IR varieties, about 
$104 million of IR maize seed treated with 71 tons of 
Imazapyr worth $10.6 million would be required 
annually (Figure 1). While the returns on such sales 
would be a small proportion of BASF’s annual profits, 
they are nevertheless significant within the African 
business environment.  From a private sector’s 
perspective, however, it should be understood that, if a 
company does not capture a market, a competitor will. 
IR maize is indeed a significant technological 
achievement, and CIMMYT and its technical partners 
(KARI, Weizmann Institute of Science) deserve credit 
for incorporating this trait into African maize, 
coordinating breeding efforts at the national level, 
perfecting the seed coating methodology and 
facilitating the official release of IR maize varieties. 
The potential benefits of IR maize are huge; indeed, 
this is the only Striga control technology that permits 
farmers to simultaneously produce maize-legume 
intercrops and reduce Striga seed populations at the 
same time.  The partnership’s goals would surely be 
better advanced by paying greater attention to the 
needs of seed producers, grassroots collaborators and 
maize farmers.   
Within the IR maize partnership, the role of AATF is 
the least recognizable at first glance, in part because 
AATF seeks to fill the gaps left by the project 
activities of others.  It offers advice on intellectual 
property and regulatory issues.  It establishes 
guidelines for product stewardship.  It undertakes the 
difficult task of explaining herbicide resistance to 
agriculturalists, policymakers and the general public.  
It encourages additional parties to join in testing and 
disseminating the technology.  It establishes baseline 
conditions and initiates external and unbiased 
evaluation of project impacts.  Moreover, it recognizes 
that herbicide resistance is best nested into additional 
agro-ecological approaches to Striga management that 
are more within the maize farmer’s reach (Table 2).  
One can argue that among the three “senior” partners, 
AATF most represents the interests of small-scale 
African farmers.  Considering the differences in  
underlying interests and mandates between the three 
cooperators, differences in operational approaches 
during the later stages of deployment should be 
expected, and the manner in which they continue to 
discuss and resolve these issues is worthy of 
replication in other public-private partnerships.   
In contrast, Speilman et al. (2007) recently described 
the AATF-CIMMYT-BASF partnership in 
unfavorable terms, leveling most of their criticism at 
AATF.  
This partner was described as a “latecomer” that 
created “deep coordination problems” through 
“miscommunications” and “missteps”.  No evidence is 
presented for these claims rather this information is 
attributed to unnamed “key informants”.  A complete 
rebuttal to these statements would require a paper in 
itself but, briefly, AATF joined the partnership at the 
time when its competitive advantages were greatest 
and contributed over US $1 million to assist in the 
stewardship, commercialization and on-farm testing of 
IR maize in Kenya.  In addition, AATF produced 
needed extension bulletins, newspaper articles and 
television documentaries and organized several 
national events to sensitize Kenyans to Striga and IR 
maize.  Moreover, it devised innovative incentives for 
pre-release seed production and testing of IR maize 
that greatly accelerated awareness of IR maize among 
farmers and the private sector.   
The claim by Speilman et al. (2007) that AATF 
released maize seed to those farmers in its own name 
is simply untrue, and the authors should have taken 
greater effort to check their facts. The seeds in 
question were obtained in bulk from the Western Seed 
Company; they were packaged by local NGOs in clear 
plastic bags along with necessary fertilizers and 
instructions for use, and were quickly distributed 
through farmer associations and grassroots groups.   
These packages were labeled by content alone, and 
AATF, BASF and CIMMYT were equally 
acknowledged within the enclosed planting 
instructions.  
During early 2007, AATF purchased and distributed 
an additional ten tons of IR maize seed produced and 
packaged by Western Seed Company for on-farm 
testing in west Kenya. Without the intervention of 
AATF, it is unlikely that large scale testing of IR Woomer and Savala  
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maize varieties would have taken place, or that the 
current level of awareness of Striga control 
technologies in west Kenya would have been 
achieved.  
Conclusion 
Much of the previous discussion reinforces the adage 
“nothing is more perilous than success” but this is no 
reason not to pursue the elimination of Striga from the 
cereal croplands of Africa’s small-scale farmers.   
Striga was successfully eradicated over a forty year 
period in the Southern US, but the extent of its 
coverage was far less (Sand et al. 1990).  Although 
much of this success was based upon approaches ill-
suited to Africa and small-scale farming such as 
compulsory spraying, equipment quarantines and other 
rigidly enforced legislative actions, the precedent 
itself, together with the availability of new, more 
versatile technologies demand action.   
AATF (2006) developed a strategy to eradicate Striga 
from maize croplands in the 15 African countries that 
account for 92% of the continent’s infested maize.   
While this strategy relies heavily upon herbicide 
coated IR maize, it also incorporates other control 
measures.  Within this strategy, participating countries 
are expected to develop individual Striga Eradication 
Strategies and commit available resources toward 
characterizing Striga and monitoring its decline. 
Extension information targeting grassroots 
organizations will be produced and distributed. 
National seed producers will receive assistance in 
obtaining speedy regulatory approval and licensing of 
necessary crop varieties.  Stewardship programs that 
assure public acceptance, product quality and equitable 
returns will be installed. Coercive measures, such as 
quarantines, penalties and mandatory field operations, 
will be avoided in favor of providing incentives to 
households that become ready adopters of new Striga 
eradication practices.  This strategy is proving to be a 
“hard-sell” to the donor community, including those 
with past investment in IR maize, in part because of 
the mixed messages being received about the origins 
and effectiveness of Imazapyr resistance, and 
occasional mishaps on the road to commercial 
deployment of IR maize varieties.  Despite these 
setbacks, the development and deployment of IR 
maize is setting an example for dynamic public-private 
partnership in agriculture and demonstrating how 
technological achievements from the private sector 
(e.g. multinational corporations) can be used by public 
research institutions (e.g. CGIAR, NARS) to develop 
products that finally reach and benefit resource poor 
African farmers. 
 Striga eradication requires that very different partners 
work together toward a difficult common goal. Rural 
households, farmer organizations, agricultural research 
systems, the private sector, policymakers and donors 
all occupy indispensable, complimentary roles. 
Holding such a partnership together in a way that each 
participant may find their personal interest and 
organizational responsibilities fulfilled is not an easy 
task. Nevertheless, the potential of IR maize varieties 
to provide relief to African smallholder maize farmers 
remains great (Figure 1) and should not be allowed to 
remain unused. There should be no drama surrounding 
such an important technological breakthrough; rather, 
greater priority should be assigned to the management 
of Striga in Africa. Finally, it should be recognized 
that bringing Striga under control in smallholder maize 
farmers’ fields is consistent with other emerging, more 
holistic paradigms for African economic recovery, 
particularly approaches designed along the agricultural 
value chain.  
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Table 1. Striga coverage, yield reduction and economic loss in Africa’s maize croplands, by sub-regions and for selected 
countries 
Area Coverage  Maize  grain loss  Economic loss 
  x 1000 ha  tons per year  US $ per year 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2,363  1,623,838  $383,290,000 
Southern Africa  589  372,802  $69,708,000 
    Malawi  291  208,221  $27,900,000 
West Africa  1,243  790,084  $250,095,000 
    Nigeria  835  505,308  $205,660,000 
East Africa  531  460,953  $68,487,000 
   Kenya  217  182,227  $28,610,000 
Table 2.  Average seasonal crop yield and economic returns from the different Striga management practices. 
management  total             grain yield   net   benefit:cost  maize cost 
 cost  maize  legume  return  ratio  per  bag 
 ($  ha
-1)    ------- kg ha
-1 ------ ($  ha
-1)    ($  90-kg
-1) 
Push Pull
1 238  2103  none  128  1.54  7.20 
UK-I w/bean
2 224  1454  277  154  1.69  9.66 
H513 w/bean  218  1579  381  228  2.04  8.60 
MBILI PP BISH
3 274 2288  422  314  2.15  6.88 
KSTP94 w/bean  220  2323  364  348  2.58  6.22 
WH502 w/bean  232  2461  376  366  2.57  6.38 
IR maize w/bean
4 238  2601 345  370  2.56  6.30 
1  Maize/desmodium intercrop without napier grass, no value assigned to desmodium forage. 
2  Imazapyr resistant maize hybrid Ua Kayongo without seed-coated herbicide.  
3  A modified Push Pull system that includes desmodium and beans within the maize understorey.  
4  Imazapyr resistant maize hybrid Ua Kayongo with 30 g ha
-1 seed-coated herbicide. Striga Management Through Herbicide Resistance 

















Figure 1. The potential seed and Imazapyr markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the additional maize 
production and value likely to result from 100% adoption of IR maize in Striga-affected areas.  This 
projection is based upon incremental yields in west Kenya and assumes that 30 g of imazapyr per ha is 
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